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My research project explores the figure of Thanatos in relation to two 
novels by Jack Kerouac, Tristessa and Big Sur, published respectively in 1960 
and 1962, and one long poem by Allen Ginsberg, ‘Howl’, published in 1956.1 
Although both writers are labelled as ‘Beat writers’, this project does not directly 
address the cultural phenomenon of the ‘Beat Generation’, a term too generic and 
imprecise to be truly relevant in a literary context; rather, it is an aesthetic, literary 
and philosophical investigation that is grounded in close textual analysis, as I will 
show through this presentation. Each text, each writer is dealt with individually to 
apprehend the subtlety of their writings, which will then lead to a more conceptual 
and comparative reading of Thanatos within the texts. 
The origins of Thanatos are to be found in Greek mythology. Thanatos is a 
daemon who serves Hades, ruler of the Underworld. Thanatos is reaching people 
out in the living world to bring them down to Hades: he embodies a principle of 
death within life, and a principle of life within death. In my thesis, Thanatos is 
envisaged as an embodiment of textual strategies that are highly paradoxical. It 
relies on the formulation of the prospect of disintegration in, and of, the texts. 
Such a prospect triggers a reaction that seeks to counter this menace of 
nullification, and that is either self-creative, or self-destructive. This conceptual 
interplay allowed me to highlight the contradictory dynamics of the selected 
writings, which all articulate, in their own ways, a trope of decay and death that is 
used to achieve patterns of self-creation, or a trope of regeneration that 
accommodates forms of self-destruction in its core. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Jack Kerouac, Big Sur [1962], Flamingo Sixties Classic edn (London: Flamingo, 2001); 
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In order to illuminate this paradox within the texts, I used two distinct 
critical methods in my thesis. In Part 1, I used Existentialist theory. Through the 
Existentialist principles of Sartre and those of Camus, I aim at deciphering the 
ontological processes in Ginsberg’s and in Kerouac’s texts. Nonetheless, there is a 
fundamental flaw in using continental philosophy to decipher two literary works 
that are intrinsically American, especially in regards to the spiritual dimension 
that both Kerouac and Ginsberg relayed through their writings, a dimension that 
has been consistently ignored by 20th-century French Existentialism for various 
reasons. Therefore, I designed a theoretical framework that allowed me to 
integrate the major American traditions that the texts referred to, in particular that 
of American Transcendentalism. Through a combination of the 
Transcendentalism of Emerson with the Existentialism of Sartre, I could re-
formulate the central notions of nothingness and engagement in a way that would 
make sense within an American context, and in the context of Kerouac’s and 
Ginsberg’s writing in particular. Similarly, through an articulation of the 
Transcendentalism of Thoreau with the Existentialism of Camus, I could 
determine a type of the absurd, and a form the revolt, that are both typically 
American, and that intimately resonated with Kerouac’s text of Big Sur in 
particular. In fact, the framework that I have designed is that of an American 
variant of Existentialism in my work, which combines four different theoretical 
models – that of Sartre, of Camus, of Emerson, and of Thoreau – in order to shed 
light on the conceptual figure of Thanatos in the texts. 
In the second part of the thesis, I am using the metaphysical concept of the 
sublime, as defined by Kant. The sublime encapsulates a form of beauty so radical 
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that it calls forth the very prospect of annihilation in the mind of the beholder. 
This dialectical articulation between creation and destruction, between beauty and 
death, is played out in Kerouac’s novella Tristessa. I will shed light on the ways 
in which Kerouac articulates this paradox in the novella, as he presents the reader 
with a fantasy of death that is as creative as it is destructive for self and text 
altogether. 
 
Ginsberg’s ‘Howl’ is a long poem in the tradition of American epic 
poems. It is made of four parts (three parts and a footnote) which, although very 
different in terms of contents and aesthetics, are nonetheless deeply interrelated. 
As Ginsberg writes: 
 
I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, 
   starving hysterical naked, 
dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn looking 
  for an angry fix, 
angelheaded hipsters burning for the ancient heavenly connec- 
  tion to the starry dynamo in the machinery of night, […] 
who ate fire in paint hotels or drank turpentine in Paradise 
Alley, death, or purgatoried their torsos night after night 
with dreams, with drugs, with waking nightmares, alcohol and 
cock and endless balls, […] 
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who walked all night with their shoes full of blood on the 
  snowbank docks waiting for a door in the East River to 
  open to a room full of steamheat and opium, […] 
who sang out of their windows in despair, fell out of the subway 
  window, jumped in the filthy Passaic, leaped on negroes, 
  cried all over the street, danced on broken wineglasses 
  barefoot smashed phonograph records of nostalgic Euro- 
  pean 1930s German jazz finished the whiskey and threw 
  up groaning into the bloody toilet, moans in their ears 
  and the blast of colossal steam-whistles.2 
 
 Part 1 of the poem typifies the poet’s vision through a rushing flow of 
consciousness. Each stanza is introduced by means of an anaphora, ‘who’, which 
creates a dramatic accumulation and suffuses the poem with an incantatory tone.3 
Ginsberg reports a series of actions and experiences performed by his characters 
that are fraught with danger: this combination provides the first part of the poem 
with an impression of general urgency and effervescent chaos. The use of free 
verse, a legacy from Walt Whitman (1819-1892), is highly instrumental: 
 
‘Everybody assumes […] that [Whitman’s] line is a big freakish 
uncontrollable necessary prosaic goof. No attempt’s been made to use it in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ‘Howl’, pp.1, 5 and 6. 
3 Ibid. 
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the light of early XX Century organization of new speech-rhythm prosody 
to build up large organic structures’.4 
 
It both sustains Ginsberg’s long lines, and dispenses with formal conventions of 
metre, rhythm and rhyme. It promotes a poetics that is more flexible and open to 
spontaneous expression and experimentation. 
In Part 2 of the poem, Ginsberg introduces the Blakean figure of Moloch, 
who brings a radical change of tonality to the poem through the disruption of the 
long line: 
 
What sphinx of cement and aluminum bashed open their skulls 
and ate up their brains and imagination? 
Moloch! Solitude! Filth! Ugliness! Ashcans and unobtainable 
dollars! Children screaming under the stairways! Boys 
sobbing in armies! Old men weeping in the parks! 
Moloch! Moloch! Nightmare of Moloch! Moloch the loveless!5 
 
In this second part, Ginsberg offers an actualisation of the myth of Moloch, who, 
in the Old Testament, impersonates a fire god whose worship involves the 
sacrifice of children. In Ginsberg’s poem, Moloch is personified, and embodied in 
the cultural predicament of post-war America: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ginsberg, ‘Notes Written on Finally Recording "Howl"’, in On the Poetry of Allen 
Ginsberg, ed. by Lewis Hyde (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), p.81. 
5 ‘Howl’, p.8. 
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Moloch! Moloch! Nightmare of Moloch! Moloch the loveless! […] 
Moloch whose mind is pure machinery! Moloch whose blood 
is running money! Moloch whose fingers are ten armies! 
Moloch whose breast is a cannibal dynamo! Moloch 
whose ear is a smoking tomb! 
Moloch whose eyes are a thousand blind windows! Moloch 
whose skyscrapers stand in the long streets like endless 
Jeovahs! […] 
Moloch whose love is endless oil and stone! Moloch whose 
soul is electricity and banks! Moloch whose poverty is 
the specter of genius! Moloch whose fate is a cloud of 
sexless hydrogen! Moloch whose name is the Mind! […] 
Moloch! Moloch! Robot apartments! Invisible suburbs! Skel- 
eton treasuries! Blind capitals! Demonic industries! 
Spectral nations! Invincible mad houses! Granite cocks! 
Monstrous bombs!6 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid., pp.8-9. 
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Envisaged as a predator that spreads misery and despair, Moloch incarnates the 
productive apparatus of post-war industry as well as the military-industrial 
complex, and more generally the brutality of modern-day capitalism; it is used by 
Ginsberg as an extended metaphor for the crushing conditions of modernity, 
which accommodate the menace of complete self-objectification and imminent 
annihilation. 
The figure of Moloch may also be interpreted as an agent of nothingness 
on the transcendental plane as well, as Ginsberg illustrates a contention between 
the mechanical processes and materialistic values that Moloch champions and the 
poet’s yearning for an intuitive and spiritual life: 
 
Moloch who frightened me out of my natural ecstasy! 
Visions! Omens! Hallucinations! Miracles! ecstasies! Gone down 
the American river! 
Dreams! Adorations! illuminations! Religions! [...] 
Breakthroughs! Over the river! Flips and crucifixions! Gone down 
the flood! Highs! Epiphanies! [...] down on the rocks of Time!7 
 
Here, Ginsberg’s Moloch echoes Blake’s figure of Urizen: the Urizenic mentality, 
as the essence of reason, is precisely what shuts men out of the transcendental 
experience. I argue in greater detail in the thesis that through Moloch, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., p.9. 
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rationale of post-war modernity is interpreted by Ginsberg as a barrier to a form 
of transcendental being; it turns Moloch into an agent of spiritual alienation. 
Crucially, this menace is, also, internalised: ‘Moloch who entered my soul early’.8 
It translates ontologically as the characters’ consciousness of death, which 
corresponds, in an Existentialist context, to the occurrence of a form of 
nothingness in the poem. 
This equation of Moloch with forms of Existentialist and 
Transcendentalist nothingness is extensively developed in my thesis. What I 
show, is the way in which the relationship of Part 1 to Part 2 of ‘Howl’, which is 
the relation of the characters’ chaotic actions to Moloch, exemplifies a Sartrean 
dialectic between being and nothingness. This relation, I argue, is supported by 
the form of the epic, which imparts the poetical agency with a sense of both action 
and community: 
	  
The great American epics […] strategy would be to create a hero rather 
than celebrate one and to make rather than record the history that 
surrounds him. They would, in effect, jettison the third-person hero of 
traditional epic […]; and in his place they would put the poet himself as a 
representative, democratic man who discovers his identity and values in 
the course of writing, on his own and on our behalf.9 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., p.9. 
9 Richard Gray, American Poetry of the Twentieth Century, Longman Literature in 
English Series (London: Longman, 1990), p.13. 
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The epic character relies on an adversarial relationship that fosters a sense of 
performativity within the narrative: its momentum lies in an act of defiance. It 
translates as an incentive to commit to the here and now in order to claim a future 
otherwise jeopardised. In other words, as the heroic agency embarks on an 
odyssey that seeks to defeat the forces of oppression, it builds, reciprocally, the 
contents of its own existence.  
This Existentialist reading of the epic genre allows the characters in 
‘Howl’ to become, in a sense, the product of their own struggle against Moloch. 
This characteristic in ‘Howl’, as it connects the mythical with the real, typifies an 
ontological struggle against Moloch that translates as an engagement on both the 
individual and the social plane. It fosters the affirmative and self-creative 
expression of the characters’ ownmost and uttermost self in Part 1 of the poem, 
which may be viewed as a form of Existentialist authenticity in a Sartrean context. 
Meanwhile, the last part of the poem, the ‘Footnote to ‘Howl’’, reads like 
an outburst of transcendental joy: 
 
Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! 
Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! 
The world is holy ! The soul is holy ! The skin is holy ! The nose 
 is holy ! The tongue and cock and hand and asshole holy ! 
Everything is holy ! Everybody’s holy ! Everywhere is holy ! 
Everyday is in eternity ! Everyman’s an angel !10 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ‘Howl’, p.12. 
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This ‘Footnote’ features a free, chanting verse; its excessive iterations produce an 
epileptic effect that signals a climactic sequence. Here, Ginsberg collapses the 
boundaries between the historical and the universal, and equates explicitly the 
profane with the divine. As he presents the reader with a testimony of immediate 
salvation, he echoes the Prophetic tradition: 
 
So, like a prophecy, not only in human terms but a prophecy as if Blake 
had penetrated the very secret core of the entire universe and had come 
forth with some little magic formula statement in rhyme and rhythm that, 
if properly heard in the inner inner ear, would deliver you beyond the 
universe.11 
 
After a mystical experience in which he heard the voice of William Blake reading 
one of his poems, Ginsberg envisaged the figure of the poet as a medium between 
the community of men – represented by the readers – and the transcendent; he 
interpreted his role as an agent of vision whose primary function is to reveal the 
divine essence of existence. 
 Crucially, this ‘Footnote’ suggests that the self is conceived as divine in 
essence for Ginsberg. That is to say, the self is interpreted as a fragment of the 
universal mind rooted in the individual, which implies a form of spiritual 
immanence. This characteristic, which stems from an Emersonian ethos and hails 
from the English Romantic movement, induces a bi-vocality that is primordial in 
‘Howl’. In fact, in the poem two voices intermingle: the historical voice that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ginsberg, ‘A Blake Experience’, in On the Poetry of Allen Ginsberg, ed. by Lewis 
Hyde, pp.120-30 (p.124). 
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strives towards ontological and social liberation against Moloch – devised as a 
historical agent of nothingness as we have seen – and the universal voice, that of 
the mythic, Blakean call that craves for transcendental connection with the divine 
and spiritual liberation. For Emerson: 
 
To the poet, to the philosopher, to the saint, all things are friendly and 
sacred, all events profitable, all days holy, all men divine. For the eye is 
fastened on the life, and slights the circumstance. Every chemical 
substance, every plant, every animal in its growth, teaches the unity of 
cause, the variety of appearance.12 
 
This conception of spiritual immanence and its ontological implications 
are central for my argument. According to Emerson, one may achieve a 
transcendental form of being through the realisation of his/her innermost nature. It 
implies that the enactment of one’s own intuition – the individual’s innermost 
nature, in Emersonian theory – is crucial to achieve a form of being that is 
transcendental; in effect for Emerson, the intuition is nothing else than the voice 
of nature – devised as transcendental in essence – that circulates through the self. 
This relation allowed me to shape a framework for a transcendental ontology in 
the poem; a model for an American Existentialism that regards the realisation of 
the universal principle of creation on the site of the self as the main condition for 
authentic being in the context of Ginsberg’s writing. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘History’, in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Nature and Selected 
Essays, ed. by Ziff, Penguin Classics, 3rd edn (London: Penguin Books, 2003), pp.7-27 
(p.155). 
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From this perspective, authentic being in ‘Howl’ is achieved through the 
characters’ performance of intuitive actions in historical reality: 
 
[…] who studied Plotinus Poe St John of the Cross telepathy and 
  bop kabbalah because the cosmos instinctively vibrated 
  at their feet in Kansas, 
 who loned it through the streets of Idaho seeking visionary 
  indian angels who were visionary indian angels, 
 who thought they were only mad when Baltimore gleamed in 
  supernatural ecstasy, 
 […] 
who lounged hungry and lonesome through Houston seeking 
  jazz or sex or soup, and followed the brilliant Spaniard 
  to converse about America and Eternity, a hopeless task, 
  and so took a ship to Africa.13 
 
Upon this premise, the actions in Part 1 of ‘Howl’, interpreted in Sartrean terms as 
the characters’ commitment to historical reality, may also be viewed from an 
Emersonian viewpoint as attempts to fulfil their intuition, to exemplify the 
creative spirit of the universal mind. These courses of action are spontaneously 
motivated, either implicitly or more explicitly, by a mystical drive towards the 
transcendent; a drive that reaffirms the presence of a creative principle that is 
spiritual in essence, and which highlights the impulse upon which Ginsberg’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ‘Howl’, p. 3. 
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characters act. This impulse in turn generates a type of engagement in the poem 
that is spiritual by nature: ‘Man in his fullest state thinks poetically, taking the 
tropes that furnish his mind from the natural world around him. The spirit that is 
present behind nature does not act upon us from without but acts within us’.14 
Therefore in Part 1 of ‘Howl’, the enactment of the creative spirit through the 
characters’ intuitive actions stems from the embodiment of the universal mind 
within the self; this is what induces a form of being that is potentially authentic 
both in an Existentialist context and in a Transcendentalist one. 
It appears that Ginsberg’s poetical strategy in Part 1 of ‘Howl’ serves as a 
catalyst to support the characters’ attempts to realise their ownmost self and fulfil 
their innermost nature, which they exemplify through their intuitive actions. In 
fact, Ginsberg’s poetical practice, in itself, may be devised as exemplifying the 
creative spirit of the universal mind through the poem, thereby realising an 
Emersonian form of engagement through the writing that defeats Moloch’s 
menace of poetical nothingness. Ginsberg achieves this effect, partly, through the 
spontaneity of his writing: 
 
Speak now, or ever hold your peace, write whatever comes to mind, 
adding vowels, adding alluvials, adding to the end of the sentence, and 
then rather than revising, if you have a new thought, go on to articulate it 
in the next sentence.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Larzer Ziff, ‘Introduction’, in Nature and Selected Essays, ed. by Ziff, pp. 7-27 (p. 17). 
15 Ginsberg, ‘Early Poetic Community’, interview with Robert Duncan, in Allen 
Verbatim: Lectures on Poetry, Politics, Consciousness, ed. by Gordon Ball (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1974), pp.131-50 (p.144). 
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His spontaneous method of composition generates a type of poetry that may be 
interpreted as an immediate realisation of his own intuition in writing form, right 
there and right then; the reader has access to the poet’s intuitive self-expression, 
which in an Emersonian context is intrinsically authentic. 
Meanwhile, for Emerson, intuition must be embodied and acted out in 
order to realise the divine essence of creation and engender authentic being. The 
other device Ginberg uses, accordingly, is that of a poetics of breath, which 
fosters an organic relation from nature to the self and from the self to nature 
through inspiration and expiration respectively: 
 
[…] the … rhythmic … units … that I’d written down … were basically 
… breathing exercise forms … which if anybody else repeated … would 
catalyze in them the same pranic breathing … physiological spasm … that 
I was going through … and so would presumably catalyze in them the 
same affects or emotions.16 
 
I demonstrate in the thesis that through an arrangement of breathing patterns, 
Ginsberg seeks to embody his own intuition within the rhythm of the poem itself, 
so that his Prophetic vision may be passed on to the reader, and performed 
instantaneously by the community of readers upon the act of reading the poem. 
This poetical attempt to capture the intuitive performance of the self in writing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ginsberg, ‘Improvised Poetics’, Interview by Michael Aldrich, Edward Kissam, and 
Nancy Blecker, in ibid., pp.124-58 (p.141). 
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form and enact it in the here-and-now turns ‘Howl’ into an exercise of 
transcendental performativity, which here again generates authenticity both in an 
Existentialist, and in a Transcendentalist context. It promotes a strategy of 
engagement in ‘Howl’ that is as existential as it is transcendental: it seeks to 
negate the principles of alienation that the poem articulates both intra-, and extra-
diagetically in order to liberate the self ontologically and spiritually. 
Consequently, in the light of the paradoxical movements that operate in 
‘Howl’ between the forms of engagement that the agency of the poem articulates, 
and the processes of alienation that emanate from Moloch, as chief agent of 
nothingness, Thanatos takes the form of a procreative movement that is 
fundamentally self-creative. It epitomises a fleeting motif of ontological, spiritual 
but also poetical liberation that defeats Moloch through the realisation of the 
universal mind of creation ingrained in the self. 
 
Kerouac’s Big Sur reads like the antithesis of On the Road. In Big Sur, 
both contents and form manifest a radical break from Kerouac’s previous road 
novels. The excitement and the enthusiastic tone of the early prose have faded 
away; they are replaced with a sense of doom and gloom that impregnates the 
novel from the very first pages. Big Sur deals with the narrator’s experience of 
physical decay and mental breakdown, who relocates to a Californian beach to 
rest and retrieve a sense of unity and transcendence. This retreat was initially 
envisioned by Duluoz, the narrator, as a perfect getaway from the city, from 
excessive drinking, and from his state of lethargy: 
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But the rucksack sits hopefully in a strewn mess of bottles all empty, 
empty poorboys of white ports, butts, junk, horror… ‘One fast move or 
I’m gone’, I realize, gone the way of the last three years of drunken 
hopelessness which is a physical and spiritual and metaphysical 
hopelessness you cant learn in school no matter how many books on 
existentialism or pessimism you read, or how many jugs of vision 
producing Ayahuasca you drink.17 
 
From an Existentialist perspective, the predicament Duluoz is immersed in 
typifies the limit-situation of the novel. In fact, what Duluoz experiences in the 
first pages of Big Sur, I argue, is a form of anguish that may be defined in 
Sartrean terms: 
 
[…] the face of yourself you see in the mirror with its expression of 
unbearable anguish so haggard and awful with sorrow you cant even cry 
for a thing so ugly, so lost, no connection whatever with early perfection 
and therefore nothing to connect with tears or anything […] Enough! ‘One 
fast move or I’m gone’.18 
 
Here, Kerouac uses a mirror to indicate that the narrator’s look is reflexive. In an 
Existentialist context, reflexivity occurs when ‘consciousness turns its attention 
towards itself, towards the consciousness that "has" the experience and that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Big Sur, p.4. 
18 Ibid., pp.4-5. 
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performs the reflection upon it’.19 This is how consciousness becomes self-
consciousness, which translates in the narrative as Duluoz’s awareness of his own 
decaying self. It is this self-reflection that generates anguish, understood as a form 
of ‘dread before nothingness’.20 According to Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and 
Nothingness: ‘Anguish is precisely my consciousness of being my own future, in 
the mode of not-being it’.21 It corresponds to the emotional symptom of 
nothingness, which is but the consciousness of one’s own death. This nothingness 
is internalised by the narrator in Big Sur, who reckons: ‘I’ve got to escape or 
die’.22 
And so he does. By escaping to an isolated cabin on the beach of Big Sur, 
Duluoz acts out a form of engagement that translates as a commitment to nature, 
which is also a disengagement from the urban environment of post-war America. 
In great measure, this engagement towards nature mimics that of Henry David 
Thoreau in Walden (1854), which exemplifies the Transcendentalist appeal for a 
mystical brand of the pastoral: 
 
Marvelous opening moment in fact of the first afternoon I’m left alone in 
the cabin and I make my first meal, wash my first dishes, nap, and wake 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Allard Den Dulk, Existentialist Engagement in Wallace, Egger & Foer: A 
Philosophical Analysis of Contemporary American Literature (New York: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2015), p.26. 
20 Ann Fulton, Apostles of Sartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963 (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1999), p.73. 
21 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology 
[1943], trans. by Hazel E. Barnes, rev. by Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre (Oxon: Routledge 
Classics, repr. 2007), p.56. 
22 Big Sur, p.5. 
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up to hear the rapturous ring of silence or Heaven even within and 
throughout the gurgle of the creek.23 
 
Thoreau’s method in Walden embodies a movement from the particular to the 
universal, and from the empirical towards the ideal: it takes the observation of 
nature as its starting point. For Thoreau, the diversity of natural phenomena 
ultimately pertains to the unity and ubiquity of the principle of creation, that is, 
the godhead. Thus for Thoreau, nature is envisaged as the physical expression of 
the spiritual essence of creation, which is universal and a-historical. 
This conception has major ontological consequences: in Thoreau’s 
Transcendentalism, being finds its most authentic expression by existing as close 
as possible to natural phenomena. This search for the greatest possible closeness 
to nature recalls Camus’s creative interplay between the absurd and authentic 
being. For Camus, the absurd generates an affirmative engagement with one’s 
environment; simultaneously, the individual who engages is ever aware of the 
predicament of absurdity, which acknowledges the structural impossibility of 
coalescing with the world. As we transpose Camus’s Existentialist precepts to 
Thoreau’s transcendental ontology, it follows that the self, although it cannot be 
wholly and perfectly integrated into nature, actively militates for its inclusion. It is 
through one’s attempts to merge with nature, that the individual experiences a 
form of ultimate being – of authentic being – that is potentially transcendental, 
and that simultaneously regenerates the self. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., p.15. 
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Nonetheless in Big Sur, as Duluoz runs away from the big city, his attempt 
at reconnection with primitive nature fails irremediably. As Duluoz goes down the 
canyon, Kerouac makes it clear that his narrator is not welcome to Big Sur: ‘An 
angry war that doesn’t want me pokin around […] – It is a dark clangoror in the 
rain forest and doesnt want no skid row bum to carry to the sea’.24 Through a 
trope of alienation that references several attributes of the Gothic, Duluoz is 
estranged from nature, which is pictured as a force that is frightful and inimical. 
Accordingly, the loss of his close relationship with nature involves a separation 
from its spiritual essence in a Transcendentalist context, which signifies the 
narrator’s segregation from the divine. Simultaneously, Kerouac makes Duluoz’s 
descent on Big Sur look like a re-enactment of the Christian myth of the Fall. In 
my thesis, I show that through this intermingling of several spiritual frameworks, 
Kerouac works at the edge of the Transcendentalist tradition, reconfigured in 
Christian terms. This sudden estrangement from transcendental nature and from 
the divine provides Kerouac’s writing in Big Sur with a distinct melancholy that 
mourns a mythical state of Edenic harmony – that of the pastoral. 
Nevertheless, the narrator’s estrangement from outer nature in the novel is 
also an effect of his self-alienation. The reflexivity of Duluoz’s consciousness, 
which I have underlined earlier, is underpinned by the relentless inwardness of his 
look. This inwards look, as it monitors the harmful effects of alcohol and sickness 
on both body and mind, magnifies the sick self; this is what maintains the 
experience of anguish throughout the novel. Crucially, Duluoz’s visual focus on 
his own mortification is precisely what keeps him from accessing visions, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., p.9. 
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have a transcendental value in Kerouac’s writing. I demonstrate in the thesis that 
the inner-directedness of the narrator’s look is what nullifies his capacity to 
experience visionary states. These states, which materialise a continuity between 
the individual, nature and the divine, are intrinsically regenerative for the self in a 
Transcendentalist context; this is what Kerouac illustrated through the ‘IT’ 
moments of novels such as On the Road for instance. 
In Big Sur, as Duluoz fails to apprehend the visionary, he cannot transact 
with the spiritual essence of nature and actualise his own self: as a consequence, 
he degenerates: ‘"I’m going crazy […] maybe I’ll have to, maybe we’ll have to 
leave or something, I think I’ll die here"’.25 This narrative strategy, which is 
foregrounded in the narrator’s experience of anguish, typifies a process of self-
alienation in the novel, which is strengthened by the modernistic quality of the 
writing: 
 
The allusiveness of Modernism, with all its tangents and cotangents in 
stream of consciousness and the modern novel, […] denotes an insipient 
and binding reflexivity; when conjoined with realism in ‘modern realism’, 
the term is used to signify the priority of a subjective imagination or 
consciousness as it apprehends and reconstructs everyday reality. […] 
Modernism is realism reinvented, its phenomenological origins in the 
superseding inner vision of the artist.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid., p.170. 
26 Aaron Sultanik, Inventing Orders: An Essay and Critique in 20th Century American 
Literature (1950-2000) (Lanham: University Press of America, 2003), pp.12-13. 
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Kerouac’s modernistic style emphasises the confessional dimension of his 
project, which, as it seeks to absorb the world and re-present it through prose – 
thereby rendering private life public – discloses the writer’s interiority. 
Meanwhile, the narrator’s relocation to Big Sur also involves a process of 
disengagement from the contemporaneous social and historical reality; a 
disengagement which, as I show in the thesis, paradoxically fuels his existential 
crisis. For Thoreau, authentic being presupposes an uncluttered and immediate 
channel between nature and the individual: one must secure the purest and most 
direct path to nature so that he/she may attempt to merge with it with minimum 
hindrance. It involves a radical practice of disengagement from historical reality 
which, as I discuss in the thesis, exemplifies an act of revolt that is primarily 
ontological, and that resembles that of Camus in its structure. In Big Sur, 
Duluoz’s revolt mimics that of Thoreau in Walden. It translates as a withdrawal 
from the cultural predicament of an America that is increasingly standardised, 
mechanised and commodified. This revolt – as disengagement –creates a sharp 
opposition in the text between the materialistic world and the spiritual self, 
between the profane socio-historical environments of modernity and the 
transcendental and a-historical ideal of nature. I demonstrate in greater detail in 
the thesis that Duluoz’s revolt in Big Sur is romantic in origin and spiritual in 
destination. This revolt, nonetheless, is motivated by the ideal self, and destined 
towards the transcendental self; it signals a radical form of individualism that 
typifies an engagement towards the self, an engagement whose finality is directed 
exclusively inwards. I demonstrate in the thesis that the self-centredness and 
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inner-directedness that Duluoz’s revolt exemplifies hastens his fall into solipsism, 
which in turn strengthens his own wretchedness. 
Eventually, in the last pages of Big Sur, Duluoz is wholly consumed and 
falls victim to an eerie vision: 
 
I see the Cross, it’s silent, it stays a long time, my heart goes out to it, my 
whole body fades away to it, I hold out my arms to be taken away to it, by 
God I am being taken away my body starts dying and swooning out to the 
Cross standing in a luminous area of the darkness, I start to scream 
because I know I’m dying [...] and just let myself go into death and the 
Cross: as soon as that happens I slowly sink back to life.27 
 
This epiphany references the codes of Catholic revelation. From a narrative point 
of view, Duluoz’s vision of the cross in the last two chapters of the novel 
constitutes a logical outcome of his revolt. It allows the reader to re-evaluate the 
nature of the physical and mental collapse Duluoz has succumbed to and to 
redefine it as a series of religious hardships on the way to salvation rendered in 
Christian terms. The narrator’s revelation may be envisaged as a reward handed 
down by the divine, a godly compensation in recognition of the ordeal he has 
gone through; it manifests a significant departure from the Transcendentalist 
tradition of Thoreau. This engagement with the divine at the end of Big Sur 
suggests that the nature of divinity is no longer envisaged as immanent: it is not 
immediate and simultaneous with being any longer, in accordance with the 
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pantheistic precepts of American Transcendentalism, but rather chronological and 
teleological – that is, subsequent to his being – in line with the Christic sequence 
of life, death, and resurrection; this allows Kerouac to introduce a sacrificial 
dimension, central in his writing.  
The sacrificing of Duluoz’s body through the devastating effects of 
alcohol especially may be envisaged as a form of liminal religious practice. It 
enables Kerouac to both incarnate the ineffable suffering of existence – which 
becomes a primer in his late writings – and play with the religious codes of 
Roman Catholicism, which imply that the body must be renounced and crucified 
in order for the soul’s deliverance. In Big Sur, this crucifixion is self-inflicted; 
Duluoz’s martyrdom encapsulates a truly masochistic impulse in which the urge 
for self-annihilation is prominent. This clandestine passion for self-destruction 
and death is articulated in the text as a trope of the glorification of suffering, 
which echoes Kerouac’s resolute belief in an after-life. 
Therefore, the figure of Thanatos in Big Sur may be equated with a form 
of inwardness. The manifestation of Thanatos emerges from an inwards 
movement embodied in the narrator at the level of his reflexive look, which keeps 
the narrator from transacting with nature and which builds nothingness into the 
text; Thanatos, as an inwards movement, also figures at the level of the narrator’s 
actions through the disengagement that he performs, which may be read as an 
attempt to emancipate from social and historical responsibility in order to channel 
the transcendent. The exclusive and idealistic form of this engagement towards 
the transcendent generates a self-centredness that translates into an alienating 
form of solipsism. The narrator’s self-alienation is morally motivated; it illustrates 
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a commitment to Thanatos through self-destruction. This self-destruction owes a 
great deal to a sacrificial tendency deeply embodied in Kerouac’s Catholic past: 
 
[T]he Catholic focus on the Passion and death of Jesus Christ, via the 
mortification of the body, embodies a mysticism of sacrifice. […] The 
Catholic penitent tries to perfect suffering in this life and hotshot it to the 
hereafter by paying the price of, not a thousand lives, but a single fantastic 
death.28 
 
For Kerouac in his texts, death becomes desirable because it is synonymous with 
the highest form of liberation. It is this dialectic of sacrifice that equates the 
degradation of the self with divine salvation; it is also this dialectic that enables 
the figure of Thanatos to be recalibrated in Catholic terms. At the same time, this 
tropism for self-suppression brings an end to travel writing as transcendental 
possibility. It signals a crucial movement in Tristessa – an experience of 
sublimation which, although anterior and of a different nature to Big Sur, is 
equally introspective and self-destructive. The tendency towards death through 
being calls for an investigation of how the Sublime plays a role in Thanatos. 
 
Tristessa was written between 1955 and 1956, as Kerouac paid a visit to 
William Burroughs in Mexico City. It is a story of unrequited love between 
Kerouac’s narrator, Jack Duluoz, and a young Mexican woman named Tristessa, a 
morphine user who spirals into addiction. The story is grounded in the narrator’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Thomas Bierowski, Kerouac in Ecstasy: Shamanic Expression in the Writings 
(Jefferson: McFarland, 2011), p.170. 
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attraction to Tristessa’s beauty and self-destruction – a beauty generated by self-
destruction from the perspective of Duluoz. Kerouac celebrates his heroine as 
much for her beauty as for her self-destructive tendencies. In fact, it seems that 
Tristessa is death in disguise: through the device of personification, Kerouac gives 
a physical form to his obsession with death, by making it beautiful and enticing; 
in one word, desirable. Tristessa embodies a remarkable oxymoron that 
intermingles beauty with death, joy with fright and redemption with threat, 
thereby conveying the paradox of Thanatos into the text. 
In Tristessa, Kerouac celebrates the heroine’s beauty throughout the 
novella. Tristessa is ‘a beautiful girl’ with a ‘big sad face’.29 Her eyes are ‘dove’s 
eyes, lidded, perfect, dark, pools, mysterious’:30 the dove, a biblical metaphor, 
suggests innocence and benevolence; it also stands for the holy ghost, the 
manifestation of the divine on earth: Tristessa is touched by grace. Beyond her 
physical attributes however, it is her cultural background that Duluoz idealises 
and fantasises about. In fact, Tristessa belongs to a specific geographical, social 
and cultural environment that is extremely alluring to Kerouac. From On the Road 
to Tristessa, Mexico is intensely idealised by Kerouac for both literary and 
ideological reasons. In Kerouac’s writing, Mexico stands for the mythical South; 
it is devised as a safehaven for illegitimate behaviour as well as a land for 
opportunity, full of natural beauty and untouched by the industrious action of 
men, a fertile land that offers visitors the illusion of the possibility of retrieving 
lost innocence, in typical Romantic fashion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Tristessa, p.10. 
30 Ibid., p.26. 
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To achieve this effect, Kerouac uses the main tropes of Orientalism. For 
Edward Said: 
 
[T]he imaginative examination of things Oriental was based more or less 
exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness out of whose 
unchallenged centrality an Oriental world emerged, first according to 
general ideas about who or what was an Oriental, then according to a 
detailed logic governed not simply by empirical reality but by a battery of 
desires, repressions, investments, and projections.31 
 
Even though Mexico does not belong to the geographical East, Kerouac’s 
representation of Mexicans as Fellaheen in particular is symptomatic of this 
romantic projection, a projection that is often reductive and that corresponds, first 
and foremost, to a distinctive narrative strategy in Tristessa. It allows Kerouac to 
romanticise and mythify Mexico; as he freely remodels the Mexican culture, its 
natives are rendered deliberately exotic and primitive. It implies that Kerouac has 
little interest in economic inconsistencies regarding social organisation; rather, he 
is using the idea of the primitive as scaffolding for his own aesthetic practice. 
Therefore for Kerouac, Tristessa’s origin is synonymous with a form of cultural 
euphoria; the mythification of her roots participates in the definition of her beauty. 
Through the dramatisation and idealisation of her beauty, Kerouac creates a 
favourable aesthetic ground to the emergence of the sublime, as we are about to 
see. 	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2003), p.8. 
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Tristessa’s appearance, however idealised, remains contradictory in nature. 
Kerouac depicts Tristessa with ‘[…] long sad eyelids, and Virgin Mary 
resignation […] and eyes of astonishing mystery with nothing-but-earth-depth 
expressionless half disdain and half mournful lamentation of pain’.32 We may say 
that Tristessa embodies the biblical figure of the pietà, the mother of the Christ; 
the compassion, and so forth. While this is very true, my reading, however, 
suggests that the novella stages a reenactment of the passion of the Christ, in 
which the authorial figure stands for the Creator, and Tristessa embodies the 
suffering of Christ as she goes through an allegorical process of crucifixion 
through the drugs. Indeed, Kerouac’s religious depiction of Tristessa brings her 
close to martyrdom: 
 
[O]nce a year together they [Tristessa and her band]’d taken hikes to 
Chalmas to the mountain to climb part of it on their knees to come to the 
shrine of piled crutches left there by pilgrims healed of disease, the 
thousand tapete-straws laid out in the mist where they sleep the night out 
in blankets and raincoats – returning, devout, hungry, healthy, to light new 
candles to the Mother and hitting the street again for their morphine –33 
 
In accordance with the codes of Roman Catholicism, Kerouac punishes the 
transient body to elevate the soul. As Duluoz claims: ‘And as I know death is 
best’.34 As Kerouac stands for Tristessa’s Creator, he must degrade and destroy 
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33 Ibid., p.12. 
34 Ibid., p.81. 
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her carnal envelope to free her divine essence, a source of transcendence for the 
narrator/observer: ‘I think of the inexpressible tenderness of receiving […] the 
sacrificial sick body of Tristessa and I almost feel like crying’.35 Tristessa thus 
embodies an intermingling of beauty and pain: these two factors interact with one 
another in a process of qualification and annihilation of forms, which is 
reminiscent of the figure of Thanatos in Big Sur. 
In the second part of the novella, Tristessa’s condition deteriorates, mainly 
because of the drugs. And yet, although she becomes an easy pray for death, she 
does not lose her aura: 
 
[…] here comes a strange woman up the steps, unearthly and pale, slow, 
majestic, neither young nor old, I cant help staring at her and even when I 
realize it’s Tristessa I keep staring and wondering at this strange woman.36 
 
For the narrator, this fusion between Tristessa’s grace and the destructive action 
of the drugs contains the paradox of the beauty of death. As the last page reads: 
‘Bull and Tristessa are both bags of bones – But O the grace of some bones’.37 
This paradox is primordial in Tristessa, it epitomises a form of reverence for 
death in the novella, which illustrates the paradox of Thanatos. Through this 
paradox, the novella entertains an ambivalent sense of beauty, a beauty based on a 
process of annihilation of forms. First, Kerouac instills beauty into the text by 
idealising the character of Tristessa, as well as her cultural environment which is 
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devised through an Orientalist perspective. Once the form of beauty is erected, 
Kerouac methodically destroys it by means of an analogy with the Christian 
paradigm; simultaneously, he uses morphine – a drug with ultimate self-
destructive proprieties – to debase and annihilate the very form of beauty 
previously constructed. The principle of death that Tristessa embodies is what 
generates the narrator’s attraction towards her, but also what provokes the 
dissolution and remodelling of her own form in the novella: through the action of 
the drugs, her physical aspect constantly changes and yet never loses its singular 
magnetism. 
This contradictory movement tallies with that of the sublime, which 
encapsulates beauty and terror at the same time. For Immanuel Kant, the sublime 
is distinct from the beautiful. The beautiful is an object of contemplation that 
provides pleasure through its mere form. The sublime, on the other hand, involves 
a kind of beauty that generates a breach in rational understanding, a breach that 
stems from the sense of threat of the phenomenon at stake: ‘In the 
immeasurableness of nature and the incompetence of our faculty for adopting a 
standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of its realm, 
we found our own limitation’.38 For Kant, the sublime is a fearful process, because 
at first, man’s imagination cannot comprehend the phenomenon. Reason is 
deterred precisely because the sublime contains a form of terror that eludes 
conventional systems of represention: in Tristessa, this terror is the terror of 
death, which is implied by the gradual suppression of the heroine’s body. 
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Yet for Kant, the terror ingrained in the sublime also stems from the sheer 
indecipherability of the phenomenon at stake; paradoxically, it allows for a form 
of transcendence that may be felt and recorded by the beholder of the vision, that 
is, Kerouac’s narrator. The sense of transcendence in Tristessa stems, in great 
part, from Kerouac’s syncretic representation of spirituality, where Catholicism 
mingles with Buddhism. As this passage shows: ‘I see […] innumerable hands 
that have come […] to bless her and pronounce her Bodhisat […]. Her 
Enlightenment is perfect […]. "She’s an Angel"’.39 Here, Kerouac mixes up 
religious codes as Tristessa is compared to both a Bodhisattva and an Angel. He 
extracts holy figures from each religious system that symbolise deliverance from 
the body, and places them in the narrative. Kerouac’s elaboration of a syncretic 
form introduces an open spiritual system with multiple entries which, according to 
Lardas, ‘did not so much secularize the sacred as sacralize the secular, turning 
everyday existence into a drama of ultimate consequences’.40 This idiosyncratic 
feature in Kerouac’s writing, which is Transcendentalist and Romantic in 
inspiration, is paramount in Tristessa: it allows Kerouac to connect the higher 
with the base and sacralise the heroine in particular, even though she is a 
morphine user. 
This syncretic quality follows on from the Orientalist discourse as well. 
Orientalism tends to amalgamate religious frameworks of reference into a 
mystical aggregate; it subverts the various theological doctrines it is made of 
through a mythification of their systems of belief. Hence, Kerouac does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Tristessa, p.57. 
40 John Lardas, The Bop Apocalypse: The Religious Visions of Kerouac, Ginsberg, and 
Burroughs (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001), p.6. 
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simply render Tristessa as trans-religious: he makes her truly mystical through the 
transcendent impulse implied by this syncretism, a mysticism that emanates from 
the integration of a multiplicity of religious systems into a spiritual form of 
universalism. In Tristessa this syncretism also signposts a way to come to terms 
with the dualism of the text through its resilience to any fixed representation. 
Crucially, this transcending feature at the core of Kerouac’s syncretic 
formulation of divinity is instrumental for the elaboration of a form of sublimity 
in the text. For Kant: ‘[…] the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of 
form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes, a 
representation of limitlessness, yet with a super-added thought of its totality’.41 In 
the novella, the fragmented references to the divine merge into a mysticism whose 
nature is indeterminate yet boundless; as an effect, it renders Tristessa 
fundamentally indecipherable. For Bjørn Myskja: ‘[In the Sublime,] the cognitive 
failure is not of the kind where something is experienced as merely meaningless, 
but rather one where the existence of something that is inaccessible to ordinary 
cognition is indicated’.42 This is how the syncretic dimension of Tristessa may be 
viewed as instrumental for the staging of the Sublime in the novella. 
Meanwhile in the narrative, Duluoz’s room is located on the top floor of a 
buidling; it convokes images of a look-out post in the reader’s mind, a look-out 
post from where he may watch Tristessa, devised as a sublime object. 
Accordingly, for Kant the phenomenon of the sublime is located within the 
subject: ‘For the beautiful in nature we must seek a ground external to ourselves, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, p.90. 
42 Bjørn K. Myskja, The Sublime in Kant and Beckett: Aesthetic Judgement, Ethics and 
Literature (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2001), p.1. 
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but for the sublime one merely in ourselves and the attitude of mind that 
introduces sublimity into the representation of nature’.43 Therefore, the sublime 
only exists as a phenomenon that takes place in the receiver’s mind. It implies that 
the sublime is, in fine, mediated through the observer: in this regard, the irruption 
of the sublime in Tristessa is nothing more than a vision located in the narrator’s 
mind. Duluoz, as the beholder of the vision, may watch the object of the sublime 
and enjoy the show. 
 Nonetheless, as he watches, Duluoz feels more and more disturbed. The 
spectacle Duluoz attends to generates a series of paradoxical feelings: there is 
both delight in the act of contemplation, and a feeling of anxiety that creeps up in 
the text. These antagonistic feelings make Duluoz’s narration quite unreliable; it 
becomes, at times, erratic and confused. This confusion, I argue, is a by-product 
of the vision of sublimity: faced with such an extraordinary phenomenon, the 
receiver is at a loss to interpret it; the narrator’s fantastic vision of beauty and 
death, that of his own physical and metaphysical ideal, disrupts his rational 
faculties, and points to the potentiality of his own death in return. As this passage 
shows: 
 
I’ve seen it a million times, in Mexico the young men want the young girls 
– Their birthrate is terrific – They turn em out wailin and dying by the 
golden tons in vats of semiwinery messaferies of oy Ole Tokyo birthcrib – 
I lost track of my thought here.44 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, p.93. 
44 Tristessa, pp.55-56. 
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Here, the syntax indicates a floating moment during which the narrator’s 
consciousness is disconnected, letting the flow of words pile up in rhythm until 
reason is finally recovered: ‘I lost track of my thought here’.45 This passage may 
be read as a radical instance of the aesthetic practice of Kerouac: it is rhythmic 
spontaneous prose, it is modernist, it is surrealist; most importantly, this passage 
mimics a specific moment of the sublime, namely the temporary upholding of 
reason, which pre-empts the nullification of the rational self. 
Such a syntactical combination suggests that the prose itself is reflective of 
the disjunction of reason implied by the phenomenon of the Sublime. In this 
sense, modernistic forms of writing, which both emerge from, and elude, 
consciousness, are instrumental for the elaboration of sublimity into the text itself. 
According to Jean-François Lyotard: 
 
 Joyce allows the unpresentable to become perceptible in his writing itself, 
in the signifier. The whole range of available narrative and even stylistic 
operators is put into play without concern for the unity of the whole, and 
new operators are tried. The grammar and vocabulary of literary language 
are no longer accepted as given; rather, they appear as academic forms 
[…] which prevent the unpresentable from being put forward. Here, then, 
lies the difference: modern aesthetics is an aesthetic of the sublime.46 
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46 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge [1979], 
trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Theory and History of Literature Series, 
10 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p.81. 
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For Lyotard, modernistic forms are intrinsically linked to the formulation of 
sublimity. While the syntactical digressions of the writer’s stream of 
consciousness tend in appearance to blur meanings in the text, they offer an 
opportunity to experience an approximate idea of its signification. For Kant: ‘The 
sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind 
transcending every standard of sense’.47 This type of writing may be viewed as 
one of the representational strategies of the Sublime; as it conveys the menace of 
the nullification of rational meaning, it embodies the figure of Thanatos within the 
text itself. 
Therefore in Tristessa, the paradox of Thanatos is epitomised through the 
vision of sublimity, which is also the vision of death, as Kerouac renders it 
ultimately desirable: ‘“This is what you give me instead of death?” – I try to know 
what to give her instead – No such thing better than death’.48 The equivocal nature 
of this vision in the novella is both transcendental and mortiferous. It shares a 
great deal with the vision of the cross at the end of Big Sur: both visions take the 
Christian paradigm of rebirth as an implicit model, establishing incarnate 
existence as an existential horizon that must be transcended through the sacrifice 
of the self.  
The difference with Big Sur, however, is that this sacrifice is externalised 
and projected onto Tristessa’s body. This is what enables the narrator to 
experience a vision of death which, instead of generating anguish by turning back 
upon itself, depends upon a surrogate for its articulation. The vision of sublimity 
thus becomes the fantasy of death, where death is turned into a conceptual vehicle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, p.98. 
48 Tristessa, p.82. 
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for creativity in the text, an epitome of Thanatos in the writing. Nevertheless, for 
Thanatos to be preserved in Tristessa, the desire for death must be maintained 
troughout the text. Just as Tristessa cannot give in to annihilation straight away, as 
the narrative would self-destruct; it must cultivate death throughout. This is where 
the paradox of Thanatos is exemplified at the level of the text itself: Tristessa 
hosts strategies of destruction that are located within the very textual forms that 
underpin the novella. 
 
To conclude, it appears that the several manifestations of Thanatos in 
Kerouac’s writing all emerge from a transcendental practice that is ultimately 
detrimental for his narrators. In Big Sur, Duluoz craves emancipation from social 
responsibility and historical reality in order to channel the transcendental self 
without reserve; in Tristessa, he stages a yearning for the transcendent that is 
strikingly morbid and death-oriented. The exclusive, idealistic and sacrificial form 
of this engagement towards the transcendent in the two novels I have selected 
produces a downwards spiral that irremediably brings the narrators towards 
disintegration. In Ginsberg’s ‘Howl’, the figure of Thanatos exemplifies a 
symmetrical movement in reverse: through a trancendental form of engagement 
that is directed both outwards and sidewards, the characters create an ascending 
vortex that is beneficial for the self. This form of transcendence typifies the 
characters’ struggle against the alienating matrix of socio-historical reality, which 
simultaneously fulfills their intuition. This coalescence of historical and a-
historical motives in Ginsberg’s poem is eminently virtuous on several planes: it 
generates an ultimate form of authentic being both in an Existentialist context and 
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in a Transcendentalist one. This authenticity in ‘Howl’ is foregrounded in a 
fundamental inclusiveness which, as it manifests an experiential plurality, defeats 
the singularity of nothingness (the characters versus Moloch). Simultaneously, it 
endows the writing with a faithful tone that proclaims an unalterable confidence 
in the future, as the self envisages its immediate liberation in terms that are 
ontological, social and spiritual. 
Whereas, in Kerouac’s writing, liberation remains illusory; it is erected as 
an unachievable ideal towards which his narrators continually strive at the 
expense of their own selves. This narrative strategy, which breeds a harrowing 
tone of melancholy in both novels, posits a sacrificial dimension that is 
preeminent in Kerouac’s late writing. Ultimately, when Kerouac claims that he is  
‘actually not “beat” but strange solitary crazy Catholic mystic’, it does not mean 
that the figure of the Beat visionary died completely for Kerouac; rather, that it 
matured into a more radical form capable of accommodating the resolution and 
liminality of his Catholic vision.49  The narrators’ immolation in the writings may 
be interpreted as a singular Catholic practice that acts out the refusal of the world 
incarnate in order to commit wholly and exclusively to a personal and idealistic 
quest for divinity, a quest that is as uplifting as it is mortifying in Kerouac’s work. 
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